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Ml and Monetary Policy
In February, the Federal Reserve submitted its
Monetary Policy Report to Congress pursuant to
the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act
of 1978 (the so-called Humphrey-Hawkins Act),
and Chairman Volcker testified before the House
and Senate Banking Committees about the Sys-
tem's 1986 plans for monetary policy. An impor-
tant element of these reports was information on
the 1986 target ranges for the monetary aggre-
gates chosen by the Federal Open Market Com-
mittee (FOMC) - the Fed's main monetary
policymaking body - at its February meeting.
In his testimony, the Chairman reported the
establishment of ranges of 3 to 8 percent for M1
(currency and checkable deposits in the public's
hands) and 6 to 9 percent for M2 and M3 (alter-
nate broader monetary aggregates that include
savings deposits and other financial assets with
varying degrees of liquidity), measured from the
fourth quarter of 1985 to the fourth quarter of
1986. The new M1 range is wider than the usual
3 percentage point spread, and the upper and
lower bounds are above and below respectively
the 4 to 7 percent range tentatively chosen last
July for 1986.
The Fed traditionally has tended to focus more
on M1 than on the broader monetary aggregates
in conducting monetary policy. However, the
increased width of the M1 range reflects con-
cerns about that aggregate's reliability as an
indicator of monetary policy, and represents a
reaction to its unusual behavior in 1985.
M1 grew extremely rapidly last year, while eco-
nomic activity was sluggish and inflation was
subdued. Over the first half of 1985, it grew at
about a 101 /2 percent rate compared with its 4 to
7 percent 1985 target range. The FOMC's
response at its July 1986 meeting was to estab-
lish a new 3 to 8 percent range beginning from
the high base in the second quarter (see Chart
1). But M1 growth accelerated in the second half
of last year when M1 grew at nearly a 13 per-
cent annual rate and overshot even the higher 8
percent upper boundary of its second-half range.
The FOMC recently accommodated this rapid
growth by effectively incorporating it into the
1986 target. That is, it followed its usual practice
of basing the new target on the actual level of
M1 at the end of the prior year - in this case,
the high level ofM1 inthe fourth quarter of
1985.
Normally, a large M1-overshoot ofthe target
range as occurred in 1985 would risk "over-
heating" the economy and causing higher infla-
tion in the future. But, as the Fed explained in its
February 1986 Monetary Policy Report to Con-
gress, it permitted the overshoot because of a
sizable decline in the velocity of M1 - the
speed at whichM1 is spent and therefore the
relationship between M1 and GNP. Even though
M1 rose by nearly 12 percent last year, the com-
bined increase in output and prices was only
about 5V2 percent. This meant that the velocity
of M1 fell by about 61/2 percent. In contrast, M1
velocity has grown at a positive 3 percent aver-
age rate in the postwar period up to 1980.
The FOMC decided that the restrictive action
that would have been necessary to hold M1
within its range last year was not justified in light
ofthe drop in velocity, the different signals con-
veyed by M2 and M3, which remained in their
ranges in 1985, the rather sluggish growth in
economic activity, and the rather restrained
behavior of prices.
Demand for M1
Analysis of monetary developments using the
San Francisco Monthly Money Market Model
supports the Fed's approach of effectively de-
emphasizing M1 in 1985 and establishing a rela-
tively wide range for that aggregate in 1986. The
San Francisco Model describes how the
behavior ofthe public, banks and the Federal
Reserve interact to determine the amounts of
M1, M2 and M3, the total volume of bank loans,
and the levels of short-term interest rates. It was
developed and is used regularly by the San Fran-
cisco Reserve Bank's staff to analyze and fore-
cast monetary developments.FRBSF
Until the second quarter of 1985, this Model
had a good track record in forecasting growth in
the monetary aggregates up to three months
ahead. But over the last nine months of last year,
the Model made by far the largest errors of its
four-year forecasting history. These errors sug-
gest that Ml did behave in an atypical fashion,
and support the FOMC's de-emphasis of M1 last
year and its establishment of a relatively wide
target range for M1 this year.
Chart 2 plots the Model's three-months-ahead
forecasts made at the beginning of each quarter
from 1982 through 1985, and compares them
with the actual data. The average forecast error
for M1 growth in the final nine months of1985
was nearly 5'/2 percentage points (annual rate).
Prior to last year, the largest average error for
any nine successive months was 2V2 percentage
points.
The forecasting errors in 1985 came mainly from
the equation in the Modeldescribing the pub-
lic's demand to hold M1 balances. The money
demand equation in the Model, in conventional
fashion, relates the amounts of M1 balances the
public is willing to hold to the level of interest
rates, the public's transactions needs as mea-
sured by people's incomes, and the level of
prices. In addition, the San Francisco Model
allows for temporary changes in money holdings
as the process by which banks create and retire
loans causes new checking account deposits to
be created and extinguished.
An apparent increase in the public's desire to
hold M1 balances unrelated to the factors
described above caused the Model's money
demand equation to underpredict M1 growth by
3 percent from the fourth quarter of 1984 to the
fourth quarter of 1985 (on a quarterly average
basis). Nearly all of this errorwas concentrated
in the final three quarters of the year. Chart 1
plots the results of usingthe money demand
equation to predict the total stock of M1 out-
standing.
A formal statistical test indicates a significant
upward shift in the M1 demand equation in
1985. In other words, the rapid growth in M1 in
1985 resulted in the publicholding substantially
moreM1 balances than average historical rela-
tionships would have predicted.
It should be noted that, even without a shift in
the demand for M1, that aggregate wouId most
likely have exceeded its original 4 to 7 percent
target range unless the Fed had taken restrictive
action to the contrary. The Model's estimates
suggest that even without the shift in money
demand, M1 would have grown at a robust 9
percent rate as interest rates declined sharply
between the third quarter of 1984 and the third
quarter of 1985. The rate drop thus contributed
about 2% percentage points to M1 growth last
year.
Velocity of Ml
An upward shift in M1 demand implies that
M1's rapid growth in 1985 should have hao a
less potent effect on growth in GNP and prices
than would have been expected on the basis of
historical relationships. The money demand shift
can be interpreted as a greater willingness on
the part ofthe public to hold Ml balances, all
else being equal. Thus, accommodating this
willingness to hold more M1 balances would
not stimulate the economy very much because
the increased liquidity available in the economy
would not be spent on goods and services.
A so-called "reduced form" model that relates
growth in nominal (currentdollar) GNP to cur-
rent and past rates of growth in M1 (as well as a
variable measuring fiscal policy) supports this
conclusion. On the basis of historical relation-
ships, this model predicts that nominal GNP
should have grown over 4V2 percent more than
it actually did last year.
The money market model suggests that the
money demand shift accounted for 3 percentage
points of the 61/2 percent decline in the velocity
of M1 in 1985. Thus, we can attribute almost
one-half of the decline in M1 velocity last year
to the M1-demand shift. The main explanation
for the remaining change in velocity is the
decline in interest rates in late 1984 and early
1985 mentioned earlier.
Explanations
Several interesting hypotheses have been
advanced to explain the unusual behavior of M1
in 1985. Unfortunately, either not enough data
are available for an adequate test or the data that
are available do not confirm the hypotheses.Chart 1
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* Projections are three-months-ahead ex ante forecasts made
in the first month ofeach quarter using the San Francisco
Money Market Model.
imports to the measure of transactions does not
overturn the conclusion that money demand did
shift upward in 1985. We must conclude that
the causes ofthe problems with M1 in 1985 are
not very well understood.
Policy implications
Unfortunately, the persisting uncertainty as to
the cause of Ml's behavior in 1985 leaves that
aggregate's current and future usefulness as an
intermediate target of monetary policy up in the
air. By itself, one episode of large forecasting
errors certainly does not warrant throwing away
an aggregate that, for decades, has been widely
viewed as the most reliable one available to the
Fed. Moreover, Ml seems to have come back on
track in the first quarter ofthis year - the Model
predicted Ml growth at a 6% percent annual
rate from December 1985 to March 1986 versus
actual growth at a 71 /2 percent rate.
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Following the introduction of interest-bearing
NOW accounts in 1981 and Super-NOW
accounts in 1983, the percentage ofM1
balances that pay some interest has risen to
around 30 percent. Yields on this component of
M 1 became more competitive with open market
interest rates last year as market rates fell. This
explanation is consistent with the very rapid
growth in NOW accounts last year, but is diffi-
cult to confirm conclusively because of our lim-
ited experience with periods of small spreads
between yields on NOWs (and Super-NOWs)
and other liquid investments.
One plausible hypothesis is based on the obser-
vation that 1985 is the first year in which short-
term interest rates fell to relatively low levels at
the same time that many ofthe deposits in M1
yielded interest. As a result, consumers had to
sacrifice only a relatively small amount of in-
terest to hold funds in the checkable deposits in
Ml. They may therefore have shifted a sizeable
amount of savings-type funds into Ml.
A second hypothesis is that GNP, which mea-
sures domestic production, may not have been
the best measure oftransactions needs for Ml in
1985 because of the rapid increases in U.S.
imports. Although imports generate financial
transactions, which in turn require Ml balances,
imports are not captured in GNP. With imports
reaching historic proportions, the wedge
between the volume of transactions and GNP
was large last year. Therefore, the traditional
practice of using GNP to represent aggregate
transactions needs may have been one reason
money demand equations typically under-
predicted Ml growth in 1985. However, cor-
recting for this possible source of bias by adding
Nevertheless, because the sources ofMl's prob-
lems last year are not, in our view, very well
explained, it is difficult to have much confi-
dence that Ml will behave more normally from
now on. The FOMC's approach of establishing a
wide range for M1 in 1986 is therefore appro-
priate. Perhaps by the end of this year, it will be
possible to make a better assessment of how big
a role Ml can play in future u.s. monetary
policy.
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Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 203,749 2,230 13,817 7.2
Loans and Leases1 6 185,461 2,482 13,285 7.7
Commercial and Industrial 53,457 867 839 1.5
Real estate 66,623 52 3,830 6.0
Loans to Individuals 39,068 222 5,450 16.2
Leases 5,645 - 10 297 5.5
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 10,404 - 258 - 383 - 3.5
OtherSecurities2 7,885 7 915 13.1
Total Deposits 206,040 2,372 8,073 4.0
Demand Deposits 52,745 2,894 5,337 11.2
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 34,419 - 271 4,084 13.4
OtherTransaction Balances4 16,966 474 2,419 16.6
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 136,329 - 995 318 0.2
MoneyMarketDeposit
Accounts-Total 46,282 - 194 2,691 6.1
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 36,357 - 712 - 2,276 - 5.8
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 26,359 712 6,362 31.8
Two WeekAverages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.S. government and depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOW and savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items not shown separately
7 Annualized percent change